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ABSTRACT
In response to the recent Financial Crisis - after it had been widely accepted that “a serious 
disturbance in the economy of Member States” had occurred, and that several measures were 
required to remedy this disturbance, various Commission communications were adopted. The 
Communications include: The first Communication which (initially), was the only one that the 
Commission adopted intentionally: the Communication on the application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial 
crisis (hereinafter "the Banking Communication").
 However, faced with the pressure to issue more guidelines (such pressure being exerted by Member 
States), the Commission adopted three further Communications: the  Communication on the re 
capitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the 
minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition   (hereinafter "the 
Recapitalisation Communication"); the Communication “On the treatment of impaired assets in the 
Community banking sector” (hereinafter, “the Toxic Assets Comunication”)  and finally, the 
Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules  (hereinafter "the Restructuring 
Communication").” 
Whilst the Banking and Re capitalisation Communications constituted the focus of study in Part I 
to this paper, this paper will focus on the impact of shadow banking and Basel III on regulatory 
arbitrage, the corresponding need for greater transparency and disclosure within financial markets – 
particularly within OTC markets, and impediments to the successful implementation of capital 
requirements which are aimed at fostering financial stability, coordination and harmonisation. 
Further, it will consider the extent to which regulators are prepared to deviate from regulations 
during the implementation of stress-testing and rescue programmes which are aimed at restoring 
stability to the financial system.
The   redefinition   of   quantitative   and   qualitative   standards   for   capital,   in   implementing   the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Programme (SCAP), as illustrated in the paper, should demonstrate 
the extent to which regulators, independent of shadow banking practices, are prepared to deviate 
from capital regulations under adverse scenarios where certain regulations prove to be unduly 
stringent.
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Financial Stability Measures, Counter Party Risks and the Shadow Banking System
„Over the past decade, the shadow banking system provided sources of inexpensive funding for 
credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like and seemingly riskless short-
term liabilities.“
2
The risks posed by the operation of such instruments, vehicles and activities to financial stability, is 
not only evident by counter party risks which emanate from such complex and sophisticated 
instruments, the level of uncertainty attributed to lack of transparency within the financial markets, 
but also those risks inherent in the funding of maturities particularly those attributed to short term 
liabilities. 
The shadow banking system has the potential to trigger systemic risks through the provision of 
credit, maturity and liquidity transformations – a situation which could arise where parts of the 
shadow banking system are able to function without “internalizing the true costs of its risks – hence 
gaining   a  funding   advantage   relative  to   banks   where   regulation   aims   to   achieve   such   an 
internalization – which is likely to create opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine bank 
regulation and lead to a build up of additional leverage and risks in the system.“
3
As highlighted under the abstract, this paper, in constrast to Part I of the paper, will focus on rescue 
efforts, assessment and stress testing programmes which unintentionally, could result in the 
facilitation of regulatory arbitrage. Such efforts and other initiatives being primarily promulgated as 
measures aimed at facilitating financial stability. Whilst the new Basel III framework is highly 
commended, debates have also arisen in relation to whether it could trigger as many problems as 
those which it has been designed to rectify. Nevertheless, this paper will highlight why it is crucial 
to ensure that the goals, objectives and initiatives of Basel III in promoting financial stability – 
1  Paper to be presented at the 2012 IBFR (Institute for Business & Finance Research) COSTA RICA 
CONFERENCIA/ CONGRESO GLOBAL ADMINISTRACION Y FINANZAS SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA: MAYO 
22-25, 2012. For further details on the Conference, please visit http://www.theibfr.com/costaricaesp.htm
2 See Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky , „Shadow Banking“ Staff Report No 458 
July 2010, Federal Reserve Bank of New York  http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf at page 
2 of 81 (abstract of the paper). Shadow banking is considered to comprise of „ financial intermediaries that conduct 
maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit 
guarantees. Examples of shadow banks include finance companies, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
conduits, limited-purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles, credit hedge funds, money market 
mutual funds, securities lenders, and government-sponsored enterprises.“ see ibid.
3  “The provision of maturity/liquidity transformation and leverage could make credit intermediation by non bank 
entities “bank-alike” and raise concerns for authorities to the extent that they create systemic risks.“ See Financial 
Stability Board, „Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues (A Background Note of the Financial Stability Board) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf at page 3 (page 5 of 11)particularly its focus on macro prudential stability, are not undermined.
Recapitalisation and rescue schemes, as well as other financial stability plans and programmes, 
whilst aiming to restore financial stability through the most effective and least time consuming 
means, should also take into account other important considerations such as the objectives and 
intent of certain regulations – particularly those which not only embrace the same goals of the 
attainment of financial stability, but also other vital goals of harmonisation, coordination between 
different jurisdictions. Basel III provides an excellent example of such as regulation. Where the 
implementation of certain programmes in exceptional scenarios result in deviations from key 
regulations, the danger that regulatory arbitrage practices will be facilitated not only exists, but also 
the likelihood that lack of coordination and harmonisation will occur across jurisdictions. 
This paper will highlight the fact that exceptional situations have resulted in derogations from 
certain norms – however such deviations could be justified in certain cases – particularly in view of 
the importance attached to the goal of achieving speedy financial recovery as well as where these 
situations are intended to be one-off scenarios. Emergency legislation designed to address short 
term and serious disruptions to the economy/adverse scenarios, or unprecedented deviations from 
the norm under adverse scenarios, it should be pointed out, should also be distinguished from 
rampant practices deliberately aimed at circumventing key and/or not so central capital legislation.
The paper commences with a section which is aimed at underlining the importance of stress tests in 
promoting transparency and disclosure across the financial markets – such measures aimed at 
facilitating market discipline. The section will also introduce types of regulatory arbitrage which 
which are likely to result in the circumvention of capital requirements designed to „manage linkages 
and prudently conduct negotiations“ between vital financing channels.
Section   two   then   elaborates   on   rescue   and   financial   stability   measures   which   have   been 
implemented in the European Union, as well as the United States. The section also re-iterates 
certain observations drawn from the first part to the paper – whereby a more lenient stance has been 
adopted by the Commission as a means of ensuring that the all important goal of avoiding „serious 
disturbances to the economy of Member States“ is attained. This scenario, being peculiar to the EU, 
is then used as the building block for the next section (section three) which will address the 
exceptional   scenarios   whereby   supervisors   in   the   US   have   deviated   from  standard   capital 
requirements. Within this context, the implementation of the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program (SCAP), comprising the 2009 stress tests which constituted a “special forward-looking 
assessment exercise” to “evaluate expected losses and the resources to absorb those losses” will be 
considered. The section will also aim to deduce whether one-off deviations by supervisors during 
the implementation of the SCAP could be justified – where such deviations imply derogations from 
key legislation such as the Basel Accords.
Concerns attributed to the new Basel III framework relate to its “facilitation of the shadow banking 
system whilst constraining the bank sector.”
4  The new, more stringent capital and liquidity 
requirements introduced through Basel III are likely to impact the more highly regulated banking 
sector since it is likely that there will be greater incentives to transact in less stringent regulated 
sectors such as the shadow banking system or through less stringent regulated capital instruments. 
 
In concluding the paper, the final section will also highlight why coordination and harmonisation 
are central to the goal of mitigating regulatory arbitrage practices.
4   See BRIEF, „Deutsche Bank CFO Says Concerned New Basel Rules Allow Shadow Banking System Whilst 
Constraining Bank Sector“ < http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-05/20264700-briefdeutsche-bank-
cfo-says-concerned-new-basel-rules-allow-shadow-banking-system-020.htmA. Stress Tests : Facilitating Greater Transparency and Disclosure Within the Financial Markets
“In order to ensure financial stability, the Commission should review and report on measures to 
enhance the transparency of OTC markets, to mitigate the counterparty risks and more generally to 
reduce the overall risks, such as by clearing of credit default swaps through central counterparties 
(CCPs). The establishment and development of CCPs in the EU subject to high operational and 
prudential standards and effective supervision should be encouraged. The Commission should 
submit its report to the European Parliament and the Council together with any appropriate 
proposals, taking into account parallel initiatives at the global level as appropriate.”
5
Stress testing not only serves as an important risk management tool – particularly for counter party 
risk management,
6 but has also been identified as a means whereby investors' uncertainty about the 
quality of bank balance sheets could be eliminated.
7
In addition to the trading book and securitisation reforms announced in July 2009, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision proposed the consolidation of the capital requirements for 
counterparty credit risk exposures arising from derivatives and securities financing activities.
These enhancements are aimed at strengthening the resilience of individual banking institutions and 
reducing the risk of shocks being transmitted from one institution to another through the derivatives 
and financing channel. Consolidated counterparty capital requirements should increase incentives to 
transfer OTC derivative exposures to central counterparties and exchanges.
However,   three forms of arbitrage which are likely to result in the circumvention of capital 
requirements designed to „manage linkages and prudently conduct negotiations“ between channels, 
broker-dealer and asset management subsidiaries, as well as credit intermediation have been 
identified as follows:
- Cross border regulatory systems arbitrage
- Regulatory tax and economic capital arbitrage
- Ratings arbitrage.
These forms of arbitrage, as identified by Pozsar et al, are also considered by them to have emerged 
from:
8 i) the fractured nature of the global financial regulatory framework, ii) the dependence of 
capital adequacy rules (Basel II) on credit ratings and iii) „a collection of one - off, uncoordinated 
decisions by accounting and regulatory bodies regarding the accounting and regulatory capital 
5  See DIRECTIVE 2009/111/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 September 
2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central 
institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management at page 5 of 
23.
6 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document, „Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking 
Sector „ at page 48
7 See also European Commission, „“Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, section 3.2.1 
Crisis Resolution Policies: Stress Testing of Banks“ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf > It is also highlighted in the report that 
stress tests could serve as “decisive tools in accomplishing this task since they provide information about banks’ 
resilience and ability to absorb possible shocks.”
8 Z Pozsar et al,  „Shadow Banking“ Staff Report No 458 July 2010, Federal Reserve Bank of New York at pages 37 
and 38 of 81 (pages 29 and 30). http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdftreatment of certain exposures , lending and asset manegment activities.“
Further evidence which may or may not justify a deviation from standard capital requirements will 
be  considered under section C  by way of reference to the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Programme – a programme which was initiated in February 2009 as a means of assessing capital 
needs of banking institutions as well as restoring financial stability back to the US financial system 
and markets following the devastating consequences and impact of the Financial Crisis which was 
triggered in 2007. Such a programme will be contrasted with other proposals relating to forward 
looking provisions.
B. Consideration of Adverse Scenarios and Serious Disruptions to the Economy.
Several stages were identified by the Commission in its Communication
9 as phases through which 
the route from financial instability to financial stability are to be achieved. These are as follows:
i) Stabilisation of the Crisis
ii) Restructuring the banking sector
iii) Hand-over of banks to the private sector at some stage in the future
Certain   financial   stability   and   rescue   measures   which   have   been   implemented   by  various 
jurisdictions all share the common feature of the more relaxed and flexible attitude which 
governments and supervisors have demonstrated where urgent and exceptional decisions need to be 
instigated to restore confidence and stability back to the financial system.
As highlighted in the predecessor to this paper (Part One),
10 the Commission’s resort to the “rarely 
used and more lenient provision of Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty, during the recent Financial Crisis, to 
authorise national recovery plans and individual rescue measures”
11
 is an explicit illustration of its 
commitment to goals aimed at facilitating economic stability through the aversion of “ a serious 
disturbance in the economy of Member States.”  Its realisation of the need to implement this 
provision occurred after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy – the first case to be decided under 
Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty being Bradford and Bingley.
In respect of Northern Rock, and with respect to the legal basis of the Commission’s decisions, the 
rescue decision and the decision of 2 April 2008 to open the formal investigation procedure, were 
taken on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines - 
the reason for this being that the Commission considered the difficulties faced by Northern Rock to 
be linked specifically to Northern Rock – therefore not justifying the application of Article 87(3)(b)
of the Treaty.
As the severity of the Financial Crisis affected more and more banks, in September 2008, the 
Commission considered the application of Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty, to banks that were in receipt
of State aid, to be necessary thereafter. 
9   See European Commission, Communication from the Commission_ From Financial Crisis to Recovery: A 
European   Framework   for   Action   at   page   3   29.10.2008   COM   (2008)   706   final   <  http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0706:FIN:EN:PDF>
10  See Rodriguez – Miguez J and Ojo M, “Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation and 
Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of Financial Crisis” and also M Ojo, „Central Banks and Different 
Policies Implemented in Response to the Recent Financial Crisis“ 
11  See D Gerard, „Managing the Financial Crisis in Europe: Why Competition Law is Part of the Solution, Not of the 
Problem” Global Competition Review December 2008 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1330326> at page 6In the United States, public recapitalisation served as a general means of confronting the Financial 
Crisis. As noted under Part I to this paper, under preliminary and substantive observations, it must 
be highlighted that competition (Antitrust) considerations have not been taken into account in 
contrast to European State Aids instruments which serve as an essential component of European 
Competition Law.
On October 14 2008, the following „watershed“ measures aimed at rescuing the ailing U.S. Markets 
were announced by the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC:
- the Capital Purchase Programme"
- the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
- the Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility
Another national recovery plan, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), comprised 
the 2009 stress tests which constituted a “special forward-looking assessment exercise” to “evaluate 
expected losses and the resources to absorb those losses” if economic conditions deteriorated worse 
than generally expected.
12
The European Banking Federation (EBF), is supportive of the provisioning based on Expected Loss 
model and recommended a provisioning model based on the EL concept, which “captures the 
economic reality of the lending activities of financial institutions in line with the six principles of 
the Bank for International Settlements” in order to achieve sound Expected Loss provisioning 
approach.
13
C. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP): A Deviation from Basel Capital 
Rules?
This section attempts to highlight the fact that whilst supervisors still consider capital regulations to 
be unduly stringent under adverse conditions, such stringency has been increased with the 
introduction of Basel III. Basel III is not intended to make life more difficult for banks or bank 
holding companies – Basel III's more stringent nature is largely attributed to the much urgently 
needed response to the recent Financial Crisis. However, it appears that even greater deviation from 
capital rules will occur following the introduction of Basel III – than was the case with Basel II.
Basel III not only embraces a micro prudential framework (an enhanced Basel II) which is aimed at:
- Increasing the quality of, as well as improving the quantity of capital;
- Enhancing risk managment and disclosure;
- Introducing a leverage ratio to supplement risk-weighted measures,
- Addressing counterparty credit risk generated through Over-the-Counter derivatives; 
12 „The Capital Assistance Program not only aimed at assessing capital needs via comprehensive stress tests of major 
banking institutions, but also ensuring that any projected capital shortfalls were met by private investors and, if 
necessary, government infusions.“  See AE Wall, „Stress Tests and Market Discipline“ Banking and  Financial 
Services Policy Report Volume 30 No 9 September 2011 at page 2. See also US Department of the Treasury, 
Treasury White Paper: The Capital Assistance Program and Its Role in the Financial Stability Plan 2 (Feb. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Treasury White Paper].
13   European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity
Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 6 
<http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measu
rement_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf>but   also   a   macro   prudential   component   which   is   designed   to   address   stability   over   time 
(procyclicality) – through counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning, capital 
conservation rules for strongercapital buffers; and stability at each point in time.
14
Providing for adverse scenarios and in their assessment of whether bank holding companies had 
sufficient
15 capital to absorb losses under such advserse conditions, the degree and extent to which 
supervisors were prepared to deviate from standard capital rules in their implementation of SCAP, is 
illustrated thus:
16
- Supervisors were not content with the traditional definition of Tier 1 risk-based capital, 
focusing instead on “Tier 1 common capital” or that percentage of Tier 1 capital that is 
common equity.
- Supervisors traditionally preferred common stockholders’ equity and mandated it be the 
majority component of Tier 1 capital, but SCAP marked the first time supervisors defined a 
minimum amount of Tier 1 capital that must be comprised of common equity.
17
- After redefining the qualitative standards for capital they would use for SCAP, supervisors 
then established a new quantitative standard: under the adverse scenario, BHCs subject to 
SCAP would need a Tier 1 capital buffer of at least 6% and Tier 1 common capital buffer of 
at least four percent at year-end 2010. Previously BHCs were only required to maintain a 
minimum Tier 1 capital buffer of four percent, although supervisors generally expected 
BHCs to maintain capital levels in excess of the minimum standard.“
18
The composition of Tier 1 capital, as prescribed by regulation and evidenced by the Basel 
Committee's efforts aimed at improving the quality of capital, is illustrated in the table below:
19
14 „The stability at each point in time component comprises of systemic capital surcharges for systemically important 
financial institutions and the identification of interlinkages and common exposures among all financial institutions, 
as well as the systemic oversight of OTC derivatives.  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability 
Framework“   Bank   for   International   Settlements   Publications,   page   9   of   26 
<http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
15 Supervisors' focus being on  „both the amount and composition of capital held by each of the BHCs.“ 
16 See  AE Wall, „Stress Tests and Market Discipline“ Banking and Financial Services Policy Report Volume 30 No 9 
September 2011 at page 5.
17  „This revised emphasis on common equity being justified as follows:The SCAP’s emphasis on what is termed “Tier 
1 Common capital” reflects the fact that common equity is the first element of the capital structure to absorb losses, 
offering protection to more senior parts of the capital structure and lowering the risk of insolvency. All else equal, 
Tier 1 Common capital gives a BHC greater permanent loss absorption capacity and greater ability to conserve 
resources under stress by changing the amount and timing of dividends and other distributions.“ see ibid.
18„Supervisors stressed these were not new capital standards, but rather a “onetime buffer [that] will give market 
participants, as well as the firms themselves, confidence in the capacity of the major BHCs to perform their critical role 
in lending, even if the economy proves weaker than expected.” see ibid.
19 Source: See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 11 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>According to Wall,
20  through the exclusion of preferred equity, supervisors ensured dividend 
payments would not unnecessarily deplete earnings, whilst also excluding the preferred equity 
received by the US government via the TARP
21 capital infusions made in 2008.
In assessing whether supervisors' decisions to exclude preferred equity is justified, consideration 
must be had to regulatory aims and objectives of the reformed rules – as embodied by the Basel III 
framework. A general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. This 
is attributed to its wide risk categories which provide banks with the liberty to “arbitrage between 
their economic assessment of risk and the regulatory capital requirements.”
22  Hence Basel II was 
introduced to address such (and other) deficiencies of the original Basel Accord. Should a deviation 
from Basel capital rules imply further evidence of its unduly stringent regulations? To what extent is 
a deviation from such stringency justified in adverse conditions?
20 AE Wall, „Stress Tests and Market Discipline“ Banking and Financial Services Policy Report Volume 30 No 9 
September 2011 at page 5 
21  The US Treasury’s interest in purchasing non-performing assets from major financial institutions was formalized as 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which was included in the bill  for the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA). See  T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight 
Lessons from Japan“ NBER Working Paper No. 14401 August 2009 at page 6. „Section 101 of EESA establishes the 
now well-known Troubled Asset Relief Program (‘‘TARP’’) and authorizes the Treasury to purchase, and to make 
and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from financial institutions up to an amount not exceeding $700 
billion outstanding at any one time, as adjusted for the operation of the companion guarantee program.“ See 
„TARPOONED: The Recapitalization of the US Financial Industry „October 16, 2008 Dewey and
LeBoeuf Publications <http://www.dl.com> pages 2 and 3 of 18
22  ‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord’ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21 Whilst the exclusion of preferred equity in certain exceptional situations may be justified, such a 
practice nevertheless, may encourage regulatory arbitrage whilst undermining the aims and 
objectives of regulatory capital frameworks. To what extent should deviations from the norm be 
permitted during adverse conditions? Should all banks be rescued? - in the same way as countries in 
need of bail outs  are automatically granted aids?
The answer to this appears to be in the affirmative – where the sustenance of a bank/bank holding 
company or a Member State is crucial to the goals of financial stability of an economy or a Union, 
then necessary and exceptional „emergency“ measures may need to be implemented to prevent 
disastrous economic consequences. The world in which we live today has been dramatically 
transformed in the advent of globalisation, conglomeration, information technology, innovation, the 
growth of complex derivative products and competition. Factors which contribute to the increased 
susceptibility of systemic risks.
Such emergency measures, naturally, are intended, and hopefully are presumed to be „one-offs.“ 
Longer term plans for financial stability which are designed to prevent the re-occurrence of further 
future „emergency scenarios“ - if necessary and possible, will also require consideration.
A re definition of and deviation from standard capital rules in one-off scenarios may be permitted 
where such „circumvention“ does not deviate to a significant extent – however where such 
deviation is capable of resulting in possible distortions and impediments in respect of efforts aimed 
at fostering harmonisation, coordination, as well as other regulatory aims, such practices should be 
discouraged. The re definition of qualitative as well as quantitative standards for capital, as 
highlighted by Wall, in the implementation of the SCAP,  may appear to constitute a significant 
deviation from the usual methodology - however this could also be permitted in adverse scenarios 
which occur on a one-off basis. A significant degree of judgement is involved in such an 
implementation and this constitutes a reason why the SCAP has attracted criticisms.
Conclusion
Concerns attributed to the new Basel III framework relate to its “facilitation of the shadow banking 
system whilst constraining the bank sector.”
23  The new, more stringent capital and liquidity 
requirements introduced through Basel III are likely to impact the more highly regulated banking 
sector since it is likely that there will be greater incentives to transact in less stringent regulated 
sectors such as the shadow banking system or through less stringent regulated capital instruments.
The   redefinition   of   quantitative   and   qualitative   standards   for   capital,   in   implementing   the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Programme (SCAP), as illustrated in the paper, demonstrates how 
regulators, independent of shadow banking practices, are prepared to deviate from standard capital 
regulations under adverse scenarios where such regulations prove to be too stringent.
Whilst ongoing debates persist in relation to whether Basel III will exacerbate more problems than 
those which it is intended to rectify,
24 a „circumvention“ of Basel III rules in exceptional cases – as 
23   See BRIEF, „Deutsche Bank CFO Says Concerned New Basel Rules Allow Shadow Banking System Whilst 
Constraining Bank Sector“ < http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-05/20264700-briefdeutsche-bank-
cfo-says-concerned-new-basel-rules-allow-shadow-banking-system-020.htm
24 See Allen, William A., Chan, Ka Kei, Milne, Alistair K. L. and Thomas, Steve H., Basel III: Is the Cure Worse than 
the Disease? (September 30, 2010) and also Ojo M, „Preparing for Basel IV (whilst commending Basel III) : Why 
liquidity risks still present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision ( Part II)“  http://mpra.ub.uni-determined by regulators, is also likely to facilitate regulatory arbitrage. As highlighted under a 
previous paper,
25  central banks’ expertise and the vital roles they assume will be required in 
facilitating the objectives of mitigating systemic risks, effective coordination and communication 
between regulators and supervisors, as well as the mitigation of regulatory arbitrage. Further, the 
mitigation of systemic risks through the redress of shadow banking channels which could facilitate 
regulatory arbitrage practices, as well as the efficient functioning of new macro prudential 
frameworks will help ensure that new Basel III standards’ objectives to facilitate greater financial 
stability on a macro prudential basis are not undermined by possibilities and gaps which could 
foster capital arbitrage and the building up of systemic risks.
muenchen.de/32630/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732304 
25 See M Ojo, „Financial Stability, New Macro Prudential Arrangements and Shadow Banking: Regulatory Arbitrage 
and Stringent Basel III Regulations „  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859543 and  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/31319/REFERENCES
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